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The term ‘information’ is bandied about in modern times. In fact the notion of 
information is arguably amongst the most important of our ‘information age’. Just what 
exactly is information though? Clearly the term is a polysemantic one, applied to a 
range of phenomena across a range of disciplines. There certainly has been particular 
interest in information from within philosophy, via investigations into its nature, 
applications of informational concepts to philosophical problems and questions 
concerning the ethics of information. Furthermore, conceptions of information within 
other disciplines such as biology and physics can and have been of philosophical 
interest. In this contribution to the Very Short Introduction series, philosopher of 
information Luciano Floridi provides a succinct yet fairly comprehensive outline of 
information. 
 
Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the emergence of the information age and 
information society. Information here has a familiar, colloquial sense and the discussion 
is straightforward, touching upon themes that readers will generally be familiar with: 
the information revolution, the lifecycle of information, the current saturation and 
continuing growth of digital information within our societies and the relevance and 
importance of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Floridi then moves 
onto the ‘fourth revolution’, a thesis he has developed concerning how technology and 
the information age have changed our relationship to one another and to the world. 
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extrovert (about the world) and introvert (about ourselves). Three preceding revolutions 
have had an impact, in both ways; the Copernican, Darwinian and the Freudian 
revolutions. Likewise, it is argued that computer science and ICTs have also exercised 
such revolutionary influence (Floridi suggests associating this revolution with Alan 
Turing). Regarding the extrovert, one general idea given, along with some particular 
examples, is the shift from a materialistic metaphysics to an informational one. 
Regarding the introvert, Floridi argues that the fourth revolution is eliciting the 
intrinsically informational nature of human agents; rather than being standalone 
entities, we are interconnected informational organisms (inforgs), sharing with other 
biological agents and engineered artefacts a global environment ultimately consisting of 
information (infosphere). This incipient idea of a fourth revolution is an interesting one. 
No doubt there remains further discussion and debate to be had on the matter and it is 
an idea which can be better assessed given an elapse of time and retrospective vantage 
point. For now, at the least it is fair to say that computer science and ICTs have had a 
revolutionary and transformative impact. 
 
In Chapter 2 Floridi introduces the language of information. As he puts it, information 
is a conceptual labyrinth. To aid navigation through this labyrinth, a general map of the 
information spectrum is introduced here and used throughout the book to situate the 
various types of information looked at. Here the reader will also get an introduction to 
Floridi’s practice of using everyday scenarios and themes to explicate informational 
concepts. It is in this chapter that he introduces the general definition of information, 
according to which X is an instance of information, understood as semantic content if 
and only if (1) X consists of n data, for n ≥ 1 (2) the data are well-formed (3) the well-
formed data are meaningful. The prime point of this definition is that information is 
made of data. The nature of data is itself an interesting topic and Floridi spends some 
time discussing general definitions and interpretations of data. ‘Well-formed’ here 
means that the data are composed according to the rules (syntax) governing the chosen 
system in question and ‘meaningful’ means that the well-formed data comply with the 
meanings (semantics) of the chosen system. All this seems straightforward enough, 
though it does raise some questions. Is it possible to have data that is meaningful but 
not well-formed? If not, then the condition of meaningfulness renders the condition of 
well-formation redundant and this definition is basically saying that information = data 
+ meaning. On the other hand, a stipulation of well-formation would rule out counting 
the not well-formed string ‘the car red won the race’ (String1) as information in the 
English language, even though it is potentially meaningful. In such a case, String1 
could perhaps be considered a piece of data that can be mapped to the information 'the 
red car won the race’. At any rate, I think that the point to be extracted from this is that 
ultimately such information can be identified with propositions. 
 
Amongst further discussion in this chapter is an outline of analogue and digital data as 
well as an explication of binary data. A particularly interesting section provides a 
classification of different types of data/information; primary data, secondary data, 
Essays Philos (2010) 11:2                                                                                                D’Alfonso | 240 
 
 
metadata, operational data and derivative data. Further to this primary definition of 
information as semantic content, Floridi briefly introduces another important type of 
information, or another way in which we commonly use the term ‘information’. This 
so-called environmental information concerns how one thing can carry information 
about another thing in a system when there is a certain correlation between the two, 
such as smoke carrying the environmental information that there is fire. In closing 
Chapter 2, Floridi goes back to information understood as semantic content, of which 
there are two main types: instructional and factual. Here he briefly looks at the former, 
as the more fundamental latter is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4. 
 
After the first two chapters, Floridi starts concentrating on particular, usually discipline 
specific types of information. Along the way, he locates these various types of 
information on his general information map. 
 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to mathematical information, which Floridi locates within the 
structured data region of the information map. This region is located at the top of the 
information hierarchy and mathematical information forms a basis and provides 
constraints for the more high-level types of information. This chapter essentially boils 
down to a swift outline of Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication 
(MTC). Also known as information theory, MTC is a branch of applied mathematics 
and electrical engineering that deals with the quantification and transmission of 
information (or data, the two terms are synonymous in this context). As is duly 
explained, Shannon’s theory however is a purely syntactic treatment of information and 
is not concerned with semantic aspects. 
 
Chapter 4 deals specifically with semantic information, which as Floridi puts it is the 
‘queen’ of all concepts discussed in the book. Since this is the one area that Floridi 
himself has most worked on and contributed to, much of the material in this chapter is 
the result of his own research. The focus is on factual semantic information, 
information that is about some state of affairs or some fact. Recall the earlier definition 
of information as semantic content; that is, well-formed, meaningful data. Floridi’s 
definition of factual semantic information is well-formed, meaningful and veridical 
data. According to this definition, factual semantic information encapsulates truth; truth 
and falsity do not supervene on factual semantic information. Consequently, false 
information or misinformation are not kinds of genuine information; as Floridi puts it, 
‘‘one speaks of false information not as one speaks of a false statement, which is a 
sentence that happens to be false, but in the same way as one qualifies someone as a 
false friend, i.e. not a friend at all’’. This veridicality thesis has been a point of 
contention in the literature and I personally am inclined to endorse it. Whilst it might 
seem that the debate is just a trivial terminological one, there is more to it. Firstly, the 
qualification of truth gives semantic information a certain rigour and significance, 
which it would otherwise not have. Secondly, there are practical benefits for working 
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with a truth-based definition of semantic information. Some of these benefits are 
touched upon, including its support of a link between information and knowledge. 
 
Whatever semantic information is, it is certainly something that is amenable to 
quantification; we may naturally say that one statement is more or less informative than 
another. What are some of the approaches to quantifying semantic information? Here 
Floridi introduces the Inverse Relationship Principle (IRP), which can be traced back to 
MTC. According to this principle, the amount of information associated with p (where 
p may refer to amongst other thing a proposition, statement or situation) is inversely 
proportional to the probability associated with p. This principle forms the basis of the 
probabilistic approach to semantic information, introduced and probably to this day still 
most associated with Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap’s seminal work in the 
area. Generally this approach provides acceptable results. For example, someone telling 
you that a die landed on 6 is more informative than them telling you that it landed on 5 
or 6, since the former is less probable than the latter. However, quantitative accounts of 
semantic information based on IRP are susceptible to two issues. One of them is known 
as ‘the scandal of deduction’, a term which I believe was coined by Jaakko Hintikka. 
Basically, whilst there seems to be a sense in which the deduction of a logical truth can 
carry or yield information, such accounts of semantic information do not count logical 
truths as informative, since they have a maximum probability of 1. There have been 
many attempts to address this issue and Floridi uses this section as an opportunity to 
very briefly outline one of his own suggestions. The other issue, termed the ‘Bar-Hillel-
Carnap Paradox’ by Floridi, concerns the fact that under such quantitative accounts of 
information, since contradictions have a minimum probability of 0, the measure of 
informativeness assigned to them is maximum. Whilst I am not sure that contradictions 
should be assigned a degree of informativeness of 0 as per Floridi’s suggestion, at the 
very least surely it is problematic to say that nothing can be more informative than a 
contradiction. Enter another advantage of Floridi’s truth-based definition of 
information, or as he has termed it, the Theory of Strongly Semantic Information. The 
embedding of truth as a requirement of semantic information paves the way for a 
quantitative approach to semantic information that measures the amount of information 
associated with a statement in terms of its truthlikeness. 
 
The next three chapters each cover a conception of information specific to a certain 
discipline (physics, biology and economics). One might note here a hierarchy of 
information that parallels a linear hierarchy of scientific disciplines. 
 
The chapter on physical information begins with a discussion of the relationship 
between thermodynamics and information theory. Maxwell’s demon thought 
experiment is employed to show how information as a physical phenomenon is subject 
to the laws of thermodynamics; or is it? The interesting area of quantum information 
and computation is touched upon before the chapter closes with a look at some 
informational metaphysics, invoking another demon, that of Laplace, along the way. Is 
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the ultimate nature of physical reality informational? Is the physical universe a gigantic 
digital computer? 
 
To keep the discussion of biological information simple, Floridi focuses on two aspects 
in particular: genetic and neural information. Starting with the former, he outlines 
fundamental biological concepts such as genes, chromosomes and DNA before relating 
them to information. Biological information is instructional information, information 
for something (in this case, the creation and maintenance of life), not about something. 
Floridi concludes the chapter on biological information by showing how the nervous 
system can be conceived of as an informational system. 
 
Economic information is classed as a form of semantic information. From an economic 
viewpoint information is a commodity with value and information quality is paramount. 
This chapter mainly focuses on explaining information as a key term in game-theory, 
which is a cornerstone of economic theory. It deals with such key notions as complete 
information, asymmetric information and perfect information before closing with a look 
at Bayesian information. 
 
The final chapter concerns the ethics of information. Like Chapter 4, this is another 
area to which Floridi himself has made significant contributions. To begin with, the 
ethics of information is discussed within a framework acronymically titled the RPT 
model, which basically deals with the connections between moral agents and 
information. Moral agents can use information as a resource, generate information as a 
product and in doing so affect their informational environment (information as a 
target). One particularly beneficial aspect of this model is that it abstracts away from 
specific technologies in favour of the more fundamental phenomenon of information. 
However, the inadequacies of this microethical approach to information ethics are 
pointed out and a more expansive and ambitious macroethical approach to information 
ethics is outlined. Here information ethics is touted as a new environmental ethics, the 
new environment being the infosphere. Moral agents are classified as informational 
entities, who are also embedded within the infosphere. The scope of ethics is expanded, 
replacing the biocentrism of standard environmental ethics (with a scope ranging from 
humans, to any form of life, to any component of the natural environment) with an 
ontocentrism, where any informational entity, anything that exists as an informational 
being is considered, in virtue of it having an intrinsic worthiness and being attributed a 
minimal set of rights appropriate to its nature. Accompanying this shift, a particular 
conception of entropy is seen as being more fundamental than the traditional, 
negatively valued notion of suffering. Entropy here refers to any kind of destruction, 
corruption, pollution or depletion of informational objects, or as Floridi puts it, any 
impoverishment of reality. This information ethics is a novel, interesting and perhaps 
somewhat wild line of thought, one which really requires elaboration beyond a review. 
Its implications remain to be fully assessed and its realisation as an applied ethics 
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unspecified and uncertain. At this stage, one pertinent task is investigation into how it 
accommodates or conflicts with standard or traditional ethical theories. 
 
The book ends on a pensive note, with an epilogue concerning the prospects of a 
successful marriage between physis (nature, reality) and techne (practical science and 
its application), two things often perceived to be at odds with each other. This is not 
exactly a new issue, but one that is becoming increasingly pertinent. For his part, 
Floridi is optimistic and his points quite commonsensical and agreeable. Information 
technology is here to stay. At the same time, we must be mindful of and avoid or 
minimise any of its detrimental affects to nature. In fact, information technologies can 
actually aid in the maintenance of nature. What is called for therefore is a holistic 
environmentalism, one that generally privileges neither but accepts both. 
 
In conclusion, this book is an enjoyable read and valuable contribution to both the Very 
Short Introduction series and the literature on information. Although a grand unified 
theory of information is elusive, perhaps even inherently impossible given such 
uncontained usage of the term, Floridi does a good job of providing a clear, integrated 
and broad outline of this potentially unwieldy concept. One thing to note is that whilst 
most introductory books concern a topic with historical depth or draw from a range of 
well-established material, since formal theoretical work concerning the concept of 
information is relatively recent and Floridi himself is at the forefront of developments 
within many of the areas, this introductory book is in a unique position with regards to 
the novelty and particularity of its content. Also, whilst there are likely to be at least a 
few different introductory books for many if not most of the topics to be found in a 
topic list such as that of the Very Short Introduction series, to my knowledge this is 
currently the only introductory book on the general topic of information. 
 
